Threat Effects and Work Incentives: Evidence From a Danish Sick Leave Reform

Jeppe Elholm Madsen

Open source

DOI
10.1002/hec.70126
Published
2026-07-08
Container
Health Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Open access
unknown

Credibility signals

uncertain Score 64/100 under policy 1.0.0. This is a metadata assessment, not a judgment of the paper's conclusions.

Show all credibility signals

Cite this work

BibTeX

@article{allodium:10.1002/hec.70126,
  title = {Threat Effects and Work Incentives: Evidence From a Danish Sick Leave Reform},
  author = {Jeppe Elholm Madsen},
  year = {2026},
  journal = {Health Economics},
  doi = {10.1002/hec.70126},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.70126}
}

RIS

TY  - JOUR
TI  - Threat Effects and Work Incentives: Evidence From a Danish Sick Leave Reform
AU  - Jeppe Elholm Madsen
PY  - 2026
JO  - Health Economics
DO  - 10.1002/hec.70126
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.70126
ER  - 

APA

Madsen, J. E. (2026). Threat Effects and Work Incentives: Evidence From a Danish Sick Leave Reform. Health Economics. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.70126

Source records