Does more generous health insurance reimbursement lead to moral hazard? Evidence from large-scale administrative data in China

Jiakai Gong, Yingjie Zhu, Jiawu Dai, Chen Zhu

Open source

DOI
10.1007/s10198-026-01976-7
Published
2026-09-30
Container
The European Journal of Health Economics
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Open access
unknown

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BibTeX

@article{allodium:10.1007/s10198-026-01976-7,
  title = {Does more generous health insurance reimbursement lead to moral hazard? Evidence from large-scale administrative data in China},
  author = {Jiakai Gong and Yingjie Zhu and Jiawu Dai and Chen Zhu},
  year = {2026},
  journal = {The European Journal of Health Economics},
  doi = {10.1007/s10198-026-01976-7},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-026-01976-7}
}

RIS

TY  - JOUR
TI  - Does more generous health insurance reimbursement lead to moral hazard? Evidence from large-scale administrative data in China
AU  - Jiakai Gong
AU  - Yingjie Zhu
AU  - Jiawu Dai
AU  - Chen Zhu
PY  - 2026
JO  - The European Journal of Health Economics
DO  - 10.1007/s10198-026-01976-7
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-026-01976-7
ER  - 

APA

Gong, J., Zhu, Y., Dai, J., & Zhu, C. (2026). Does more generous health insurance reimbursement lead to moral hazard? Evidence from large-scale administrative data in China. The European Journal of Health Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-026-01976-7

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