Stackelberg Evolutionary Games of Cancer Treatment: What Treatment Strategy to Choose if Cancer Can be Stabilized?

Salvioli M, Garjani H, Satouri M, Broom M, Viossat Y, Brown JS, Dubbeldam J, Staňková K

Open source

DOI
10.1007/s13235-024-00609-z
Published
2025
Container
Dynamic games and applications
Publisher
Not recorded
Open access
yes

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BibTeX

@article{allodium:10.1007/s13235-024-00609-z,
  title = {Stackelberg Evolutionary Games of Cancer Treatment: What Treatment Strategy to Choose if Cancer Can be Stabilized?},
  author = {Salvioli M and Garjani H and Satouri M and Broom M and Viossat Y and Brown JS and Dubbeldam J and Staňková K},
  year = {2025},
  journal = {Dynamic games and applications},
  doi = {10.1007/s13235-024-00609-z},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-024-00609-z}
}

RIS

TY  - JOUR
TI  - Stackelberg Evolutionary Games of Cancer Treatment: What Treatment Strategy to Choose if Cancer Can be Stabilized?
AU  - Salvioli M
AU  - Garjani H
AU  - Satouri M
AU  - Broom M
AU  - Viossat Y
AU  - Brown JS
AU  - Dubbeldam J
AU  - Staňková K
PY  - 2025
JO  - Dynamic games and applications
DO  - 10.1007/s13235-024-00609-z
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-024-00609-z
ER  - 

APA

M, S., H, G., M, S., M, B., Y, V., JS, B., J, D., & K, S. (2025). Stackelberg Evolutionary Games of Cancer Treatment: What Treatment Strategy to Choose if Cancer Can be Stabilized?. Dynamic games and applications. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-024-00609-z

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