Strategic information sharing under revenue-sharing contract: Explicit vs. tacit collusion in retailers

Daozhi Zhao, Mingyang Chen, Yeming Gong

Open source

DOI
10.1016/j.cie.2019.03.035
Published
2019-05
Container
Computers & Industrial Engineering
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Open access
unknown

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BibTeX

@article{allodium:10.1016/j.cie.2019.03.035,
  title = {Strategic information sharing under revenue-sharing contract: Explicit vs. tacit collusion in retailers},
  author = {Daozhi Zhao and Mingyang Chen and Yeming Gong},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Computers \& Industrial Engineering},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cie.2019.03.035},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2019.03.035}
}

RIS

TY  - JOUR
TI  - Strategic information sharing under revenue-sharing contract: Explicit vs. tacit collusion in retailers
AU  - Daozhi Zhao
AU  - Mingyang Chen
AU  - Yeming Gong
PY  - 2019
JO  - Computers & Industrial Engineering
DO  - 10.1016/j.cie.2019.03.035
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2019.03.035
ER  - 

APA

Zhao, D., Chen, M., & Gong, Y. (2019). Strategic information sharing under revenue-sharing contract: Explicit vs. tacit collusion in retailers. Computers & Industrial Engineering. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2019.03.035

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