Perceived moral objectivity: Why some moral issues seem more objective than others

Roy Schulman, Nira Liberman, Tal Eyal

Open source

DOI
10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106642
Published
2026-11
Container
Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Open access
unknown

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BibTeX

@article{allodium:10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106642,
  title = {Perceived moral objectivity: Why some moral issues seem more objective than others},
  author = {Roy Schulman and Nira Liberman and Tal Eyal},
  year = {2026},
  journal = {Cognition},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106642},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106642}
}

RIS

TY  - JOUR
TI  - Perceived moral objectivity: Why some moral issues seem more objective than others
AU  - Roy Schulman
AU  - Nira Liberman
AU  - Tal Eyal
PY  - 2026
JO  - Cognition
DO  - 10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106642
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106642
ER  - 

APA

Schulman, R., Liberman, N., & Eyal, T. (2026). Perceived moral objectivity: Why some moral issues seem more objective than others. Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2026.106642

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