A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an n players coordination game

Yasuhito Tanaka

Open source

DOI
10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00030-x
Published
2000-03
Container
Mathematical Social Sciences
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Open access
unknown

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BibTeX

@article{allodium:10.1016/s0165-4896-99-00030-x,
  title = {A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an n players coordination game},
  author = {Yasuhito Tanaka},
  year = {2000},
  journal = {Mathematical Social Sciences},
  doi = {10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00030-x},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00030-x}
}

RIS

TY  - JOUR
TI  - A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an n players coordination game
AU  - Yasuhito Tanaka
PY  - 2000
JO  - Mathematical Social Sciences
DO  - 10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00030-x
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00030-x
ER  - 

APA

Tanaka, Y. (2000). A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an n players coordination game. Mathematical Social Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00030-x

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