Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort

Pradeep Dubey, Chien-wei Wu

Open source

DOI
10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00079-9
Published
2001-12
Container
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Open access
unknown

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BibTeX

@article{allodium:10.1016/s0304-4068-01-00079-9,
  title = {Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort},
  author = {Pradeep Dubey and Chien-wei Wu},
  year = {2001},
  journal = {Journal of Mathematical Economics},
  doi = {10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00079-9},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00079-9}
}

RIS

TY  - JOUR
TI  - Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort
AU  - Pradeep Dubey
AU  - Chien-wei Wu
PY  - 2001
JO  - Journal of Mathematical Economics
DO  - 10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00079-9
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00079-9
ER  - 

APA

Dubey, P., & Wu, C. (2001). Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort. Journal of Mathematical Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00079-9

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