Does executive portfolio structure affect risk management? CEO risk-taking incentives and corporate derivatives usage

Daniel A Rogers

Open source

DOI
10.1016/s0378-4266(01)00222-9
Published
2002-03
Container
Journal of Banking & Finance
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Open access
unknown

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BibTeX

@article{allodium:10.1016/s0378-4266-01-00222-9,
  title = {Does executive portfolio structure affect risk management? CEO risk-taking incentives and corporate derivatives usage},
  author = {Daniel A Rogers},
  year = {2002},
  journal = {Journal of Banking \& Finance},
  doi = {10.1016/s0378-4266(01)00222-9},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4266(01)00222-9}
}

RIS

TY  - JOUR
TI  - Does executive portfolio structure affect risk management? CEO risk-taking incentives and corporate derivatives usage
AU  - Daniel A Rogers
PY  - 2002
JO  - Journal of Banking & Finance
DO  - 10.1016/s0378-4266(01)00222-9
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4266(01)00222-9
ER  - 

APA

Rogers, D. A. (2002). Does executive portfolio structure affect risk management? CEO risk-taking incentives and corporate derivatives usage. Journal of Banking & Finance. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4266(01)00222-9

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