Zealots can both promote and undermine cooperation in the generalized optional public goods game.

Dong Y, Li S, Shi L.

DOI: 10.1063/5.0352497
Published: 2026-09-01
Container: Chaos
Publisher: Not recorded
Open access: no

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Cite this work

BibTeX

@article{allodium:10.1063/5.0352497,
  title = {Zealots can both promote and undermine cooperation in the generalized optional public goods game.},
  author = {Dong Y and  Li S and  Shi L.},
  year = {2026},
  journal = {Chaos},
  doi = {10.1063/5.0352497},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0352497}
}

RIS

TY  - JOUR
TI  - Zealots can both promote and undermine cooperation in the generalized optional public goods game.
AU  - Dong Y
AU  -  Li S
AU  -  Shi L.
PY  - 2026
JO  - Chaos
DO  - 10.1063/5.0352497
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0352497
ER  -

APA

Y, D., S, L., & L., S. (2026). Zealots can both promote and undermine cooperation in the generalized optional public goods game.. Chaos. https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0352497

Source records

europe-pmc · retrieved 2026-09-25T01:41:20.265Z