Independence, discretion and accountability in the evolving monetary policy framework of the European Central Bank.

Hinarejos A, Rakic D

Open source

DOI
10.1177/1023263x231224728
Published
2023 Aug
Container
Maastricht journal of European and comparative law
Publisher
Not recorded
Open access
yes

Credibility signals

limited evidence Score 45/100 under policy 1.0.0. This is a metadata assessment, not a judgment of the paper's conclusions.

Show all credibility signals

Cite this work

BibTeX

@article{allodium:10.1177/1023263x231224728,
  title = {Independence, discretion and accountability in the evolving monetary policy framework of the European Central Bank.},
  author = {Hinarejos A and Rakic D},
  year = {2023},
  journal = {Maastricht journal of European and comparative law},
  doi = {10.1177/1023263x231224728},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263x231224728}
}

RIS

TY  - JOUR
TI  - Independence, discretion and accountability in the evolving monetary policy framework of the European Central Bank.
AU  - Hinarejos A
AU  - Rakic D
PY  - 2023
JO  - Maastricht journal of European and comparative law
DO  - 10.1177/1023263x231224728
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263x231224728
ER  - 

APA

A, H., & D, R. (2023). Independence, discretion and accountability in the evolving monetary policy framework of the European Central Bank.. Maastricht journal of European and comparative law. https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263x231224728

Source records