The Effect of a Right-of-First-Refusal Clause in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk-Averse Bidders

Karine Brisset, François Cochard, François Maréchal

Open source

DOI
10.1628/jite-2020-0034
Published
2020
Container
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Publisher
Mohr Siebeck
Open access
unknown

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BibTeX

@article{allodium:10.1628/jite-2020-0034,
  title = {The Effect of a Right-of-First-Refusal Clause in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk-Averse Bidders},
  author = {Karine Brisset and François Cochard and François Maréchal},
  year = {2020},
  journal = {Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics},
  doi = {10.1628/jite-2020-0034},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0034}
}

RIS

TY  - JOUR
TI  - The Effect of a Right-of-First-Refusal Clause in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk-Averse Bidders
AU  - Karine Brisset
AU  - François Cochard
AU  - François Maréchal
PY  - 2020
JO  - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
DO  - 10.1628/jite-2020-0034
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0034
ER  - 

APA

Brisset, K., Cochard, F., & Maréchal, F. (2020). The Effect of a Right-of-First-Refusal Clause in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk-Averse Bidders. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2020-0034

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