Mutual observability determines when precedent is moralized in multi-agent coordination games

Calcott R, Braga A, Cushman FA, Le Pargneux A.

DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/b94np_v1
Published: 2026-03-12
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Cite this work

BibTeX

@article{allodium:10.31234/osf.io/b94np_v1,
  title = {Mutual observability determines when precedent is moralized in multi-agent coordination games},
  author = {Calcott R and  Braga A and  Cushman FA and  Le Pargneux A.},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.31234/osf.io/b94np_v1},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/b94np_v1}
}

RIS

TY  - JOUR
TI  - Mutual observability determines when precedent is moralized in multi-agent coordination games
AU  - Calcott R
AU  -  Braga A
AU  -  Cushman FA
AU  -  Le Pargneux A.
PY  - 2026
DO  - 10.31234/osf.io/b94np_v1
UR  - https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/b94np_v1
ER  -

APA

R, C., A, B., FA, C., & A., L. P. (2026). Mutual observability determines when precedent is moralized in multi-agent coordination games. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/b94np_v1

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europe-pmc · retrieved 2026-11-10T12:17:13.686Z